Fakhri Zini: After splitting 60-year-old Cyprus into two sides, a federal solution has become a high-risk target.

The former chairman of the Council of Cypro-Turkish Associations in the UK (CTCA UK), Fahri Zihni, in his article published in the Cyprus Mail newspaper, addressed the question "what are the chances of a federal solution after 60 years of division between the two sides in Cyprus". In his article, Fakhri Zihni pointed out the possible negative consequences that could arise during a federal solution such as power sharing, property issue, security and military issues. He noted that a federal solution is a "high-risk goal" and that "the devil lies in the details" in such a solution. Fakhri Zikhni's article in the Cyprus Mail is below.

'When a 'common understanding' was reached regarding Cyprus halloumi cheese and its protected name''origin (PID), this ended in disappointment as it was "vague" and lacked the necessary details.

With limited publicly available information about UNFICYP Chief Colin Stewart's 'shared understanding' proposal for the PIL, we can only hope that the necessary details will be provided and this will pave the way for new negotiations. So, what are the chances of a federal solution when Cypro-Turkish leader Ersin Tatar is pushing hard for a two-state solution while Cypro-Russian leader Nikos Christodoulidis is portraying a federal solution? We know that in July 2017, when the Crans-Monan talks failed, Cypriot Romanian President Nicos Anastasiades approached Turkish head of diplomacy Mevlut''Çavuşoğlu with words about the possibility of a two-state solution for Cyprus. Anastasiades' interest in this option, having been confirmed in his subsequent interview with Politis, was also confirmed by Archbishop Chrysostomos II and AKEL party leader Andro Kyprianou. So why did the experienced and cunning Cypro-Romanian president turn to this option? We can't read his mind, but we can assess the risk-benefit ratio for the politician in power.

Already in 1960, the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was a federal solution, but in the first three years it failed to meet the needs of both communities. From December 1963 onwards, the system collapsed completely as a result of conflicts in which hundreds of people died and some 25,000 Turks, 500 Armenians and 200 Cypriot refugees.''Thus, for the past 60 years, elected Cypro-Romanian governments and institutions have benefited from a single-ethnic national decision-making system that excludes Cypro-Turks. In the event of a federal solution, politicians, civil servants, EU representatives, business leaders, NGOs, central banks, health institutions and other important national institutions will have to accept the principle of sharing power and freeing up cadres to accept Cyproturks in positions, including high positions. How do they react to this? Cypriot Romanians and Cyproturks have known no other enemy since 1960 but each other and their 'main' countries, Greece and Turkey, and issues such as the division of the eastern Mediterranean gas fields,''unfinished, erroneous and often expired land issues, as well as identifying current owners and determining market value, will be a long and laborious process beyond 60 years and generations of grandchildren. Resolving the complex issues of exchange, reversion and compensation will be the subject of fierce debate.

There are many widespread structures altering the use of Cyproturk real estate in Larnaca and the 'Russian' town in Nova Iskeli, owned largely by Cyproturks. The resolution of all these issues will take years and result in numerous court cases in a dispute between two ethnic communities with a dark past when the ongoing''An attempt to find missing people, most often horribly murdered by the other side. Will people be willing to wait that long or will they take justice into their own hands?

The federal Annan Plan rejected by the Cyproturks in 2004 was, against all odds, the most comprehensive and reasonable attempt at a solution, but the physical and demographic structure has changed in both sides since then. In the last 20 years, another generation born "on the other side" has disappeared. Families, including new migrants, are increasingly "merging" with their own regions. It is likely that those who are already using Cyproturkish properties in southern Cyprus for personal and commercial purposes will not want to risk losing their existing in''federations and will be opposed. The same will apply to the Cyproturks in the north. Nikos Anastasiades, at the pinnacle of his political career, managing a strong economy, maintaining close contacts with French, German, British and American heads of state and leaving an undeniable sensible legacy after his resignation, did not ignore the accumulated potentially high risks of failure in implementing a federal solution. Anastasiades may have been concerned about the possibility of bearing all the blame and years of violence. Anastasiades rejected the federal solution in favor of the two-state option because the two states offered the Cyprorum community a clear agreement that provides ample opportunity to live without''need to share power and without the risk of chaos, anarchy and even violence. After 60 years of division between the two communities in Cyprus, a federal solution requires a lot of she-devils. This is a high-risk goal. Maintaining more than 49 years of unprecedented peace should be the first priority, and both sides should at least unconditionally consider these two options.